

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01978 01 OF 03 102007Z

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07

L-02 ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1122

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5210

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 1978

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SP, NATO

SUBJ: BRIEFING ON SPAIN

REF: A. STATE 081345 (NOTAL) B. USNATO 1938 C. STATE 080158

SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO U.S. INVITATION AT APRIL 9 NAC TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON US-SPANISH NEGOTIATIONS TO INTERESTED PERMREPS, ACTING SYG AND ALL MEMBERS OF NAC EXCEPT DENMAKR, ICELAND, LUXEMBOURG AND NORWAY ATTENDED APRIL 10 PRIVATE MEETING AT USNATO. AMBASSADOR BRUCE INTRODUCED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECDEF BERGOLD WHO DREW FULLY ON REF C IN A FORMAL PRESENTATION TO ALLIES. DURING THE INTERESTING AND INFORMAL QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WHICH FOLLOWED, PERMREPS PROBED THE ISSUE OF WHAT SORT OF RELATIONSHIP OF SPAIN WITH NATO MIGHT POSSIBLY MEET MINIMUM SPANISH REQUIREMENTS AND STILL NOT EXCEED POLITICAL TOLERANCE OF THOSE ALLIES MOST STRONGLY OPPOSED TO NATO ASSOCIATION WITH SPAIN. END SUMMARY.

1. AT 11 A.M., APRIL 9, IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01978 01 OF 03 102007Z

INVITATION, DELIVERED TO PERMREPS AT APRIL 9 NAC (REF B), ASYG PANSA AND PERMREPS OF BELGIUM, CANADA, FRANCE, FRG, GREECE, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, TURKEY AND UK JOINED AMBASSADOR BRUCE IN A MEETING WITH DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

HARRY BERGOLD FOR BRIEFING ON AND DISCUSSION OF U.S.-SPANISH BILATERAL SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS. MOST PERMREPS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY ONE NOTETAKER EACH. NO PAPERS WERE DISTRIBUTED BY MISSION.

2. BERGOLD'S PRESENTATION WAS EXACTLY PER REF C.

3. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) OPENED THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD. HE VERIFIED THAT U.S. FORCES IN SPAIN ARE UNDER CINCEUR, WHO IS ALSO SACEUR, AND ASKED IF SOME LINK DOESN'T ALREADY EXIST BETWEEN U.S. AND SPANISH FORCES. IN SUCH A CASE, SPAIN MUST ALREADY BE PARTICIPATING IN WESTERN DEFENSE. BERGOLD REPLIED THAT THE SPANISH ARE NOT PRIVY TO U.S. PLANS WHICH ARE NATO PLANS AND THIS IS ONE OF THEIR MAJOR COMPLAINTS. NO OFFICIAL WAY EXISTS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. (NATO) AND SPANISH FORCES.

4. DE ROSE (FRANCE) ASKED IF THERE ARE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF U.S. FORCES IN SPAIN DURING TIME OF WAR. BERGOLD ANSWERED THAT THE SPANISH DO HAVE SOME SAY IN USE OF U.S. FORCES OPERATING IN SPANISH LAND AND AIR SPACE.

5. KRAPF (FRG) ASKED ABOUT SPANISH DESIRES FOR RESTRICTION ON USE OF U.S. FORCES DURING A MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. BERGOLD SPECULATED THAT THE SPANISH MIGHT TRY TO GET A PROVISIO IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO USE SPANISH BASES IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, BUT THIS HAD NOT COME UP. HE NOTED THAT THE SPANISH HAVE NEVER GIVEN DIRECT APPROVAL FOR SUCH USE.

6. DE STAERCKE THEN FOLLOWED UPON HIS EARLIER QUESTION, ASKING IF A GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF NATO PLANNING COULD NOT SATISFY THE SPANISH. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING, JUST A GREATER KNOWLEDGE. BERGOLD ANSWERED THAT THIS CERTAINLY WOULD HELP, BUT STILL LACKED ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL RECOGNITION AND FORMALITY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, DE STAERCKE FORESAW NO OBJECTION BY OTHER NATO NATIONS TO THE U.S. PROVIDING SPAIN WITH NATO INFORMATION, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT GIVING ANY SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01978 01 OF 03 102007Z

SORT OF NATO LABEL TO SPAIN. DE STAERCKE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE FORMALLY WITH SPAIN, BUT THE FACT THAT SACEUR DOES HAVE A DOUBLE HAT COULD PROVIDE THE MECHANISM BY WHICH SPAIN COULD GAIN KNOWLEDGE OF NATO PLANS. BERGOLD EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THIS IDEA MIGHT BE WORTH TRYING.

7. RECALLING RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FRG AND SPANISH OFFICIALS, KRAPF REINFORCED BERGOLD'S STATEMENT CONCERNING SPANISH DESIRE FOR A CLOSER LINK WITH NATO. PECK (UK) THEN COMMENTED ON THE SPANISH POSITION THAT FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A FORMAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WOULD RESULT IN A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN SPAIN. THERE MAY BE SOME DIFFERENCE IN THE SPANISH DEMAND FOR REDUCTION DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE SECURITY ARRANGMENT IS MADE WITH THE

U.S. OR NATO. BERGOLD AGREED THIS MAY BE THE CASE, AND GAVE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT, IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO ACHIEVE CLOSER COOPERATION WITH NATO, THE SPANISH WILL ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THOSE U.S. ELEMENTS IN SPAIN FULFILLING NATO FUNCTIONS, AND THEN REDUCE THOSE ELEMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01978 02 OF 03 102048Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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ALL NATO CAPITALS 5211

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 1978

8. ASYG PANSA ASKED WHY SPAIN NOW WANTED A CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH NATO--WAS IT A POLITICAL OBJECTIVE TO BOLSTER THE REGIME OR A MILITARY OBJECTIVE FOR SECURITY REASONS? BERGOLD REPLIED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH SPANISH AFFAIRS, WHILE THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HAD PREVIOUSLY WANTED AN OFFER OF NATO MEMBERSHIP THEY DID NOT NOW ACTIVELY SEEK SUCH MEMBERSHIP. THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE THE SPANISH REALIZED THE EXPENSE AND EFFORT THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO BRING SPANISH FORCES UP TO MINIMUM NATO STANDARDS. THE GOS IS CURRENTLY EMBARKED ON A FIVE-YEAR MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THEY BELIEVE THIS PREVIOUS CONSTRAINT ON SPANISH INTEREST IN NATO MEMBERSHIP WILL BECOME LESS IMPORTANT. MOREOVER, SPAIN IS IN MANY WAYS ALREADY IN THE "POST-FRANCO" ERA AND IS THEREFORE ANXIOUS TO CONFIGURE ITS SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE IN A WAY THAT WILL BE DOMESTICALLY PALATABLE AND ACCEPTABLE AFTER FRANCO DEPARTS FROM THE SCENE.

9. PANSA POINTED TO THE RELEVANCE OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IN LIGHT OF DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION WHICH WHILE IT MIGHT MEET SPANISH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, IT MIGHT NOT MEET SPAIN'S POLITICAL NEEDS.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01978 02 OF 03 102048Z

10. DE STAERCKE AMPLIFIED ON HIS SUGGESTION REPEATING THAT, BY INVOLVING SACEUR AS AN AMERICAN, IT AVOIDED THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC BLESSING BY NATO WHICH WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE. INDEED, SAID DE STAERCKE, HE HAD OFFERED HIS SUGGESTION BECAUSE IT HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF REQUIRING NO ONE, NEITHER THE ALLIES NOR SPAIN, TO PUBLICLY CONFIRM OR REJECT ANY NEW RELATIONSHIP.

11. IN REFERRING TO CURRENT SPANISH SPENDING FOR FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, PECK NOTED THAT WHILE A NEW SPAIN-NATO RELATIONSHIP MIGHT TAKE SOME OF THE BURDEN OFF THE U.S., THE ALLIES MIGHT ALSO INHERIT A SUB-STANDARD SPANISH ARMY.

12. BERGOLD REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH SPANISH FORCES DID INDEED NEED MODERNIZATION THEY WERE EFFECTIVE WITHIN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA. SPAIN'S STRATEGIC AND GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT FACTORS. THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER RUN A BALANCE SHEET OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, BUT BERGOLD HAD NO DOUBT THAT, IF DONE, SUCH A TALLY WOULD SHOW THAT THE ADVANTAGES FOR WESTERN DEFENSE FAR OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES. DE STAERCKE AGREED, NOTING THAT IT WAS ALSO A QUESTION OF THE U.S. PRESENCE SINCE THE OVERALL DETERRENT UPON WHICH EUROPEAN SECURITY DEPENDS IS TIED UP IN THE U.S. PRESENCE IN SPAIN AS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE.

13. MENZIES (CANADA) ASKED IF THE U.S. STILL REQUIRED ALL OF ITS FACILITIES IN SPAIN SINCE THE BASING THERE OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY. BERGOLD REPLIED THAT U.S. REQUIREMENTS HAD INDEED CHANGED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. HAD ALREADY INSTALLATION HAD BEEN PLACED ON STANDBY BASIS FOR USE IN WARTIME ONLY. THE F-4 AIRCRAFT OF THE 401ST TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRON AS WELL AS TANKERS AND A MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND TERMINAL WERE POSITIONED AT TORREJON. AT ZARAGOZA, THE 75. MAINTAINS AIR-TO-GROUND GUNNERY TRAINING FACILITIES FOR AIRCRAFT IN ACE. THESE FACILITIES WERE VERY IMPORTANT GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF GUNNERY TRAINING IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN EUROPE DURING MUCH OF THE YEAR. ON THE THREE AIR FORCE BASES, THEREFORE, THERE WAS LITTLE ROOM FOR REDUCTION. AS FOR THE NAVAL BASE AT ROTA, SUBRON 16'S POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES HELPED MEET ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS DO THE UNITS OF THE SIXTH FLEET WHICH ARE SUPPORTED FROM THAT FACILITY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01978 02 OF 03 102048Z

HERE, TOO, THERE IS LITTLE ROOM FOR REDUCTION.

14. ERALP (TURKEY) ASKED WHAT SPAIN GOT AS ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN. BERGOLD SAID THAT THE 1970 BASE RIGHTS RENEWAL AGREEMENT CONTAINED AN AID PACKAGE INCLUDING CREDITS, GRANTS AND SURPLUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE U.S., BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAM DRAWDOWN, WAS ABLE TO BE GENEROUS WITH SURPLUS EQUIPMENT IN 1970, ALTHOUGH ITS GRANT AND CREDIT AID WERE MODEST.

CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES FORCE US TO BE FAR MORE MODEST
NOW THAN IN 1970.

15. MENZIES ASKED WHAT ATTITUDES CURRENTLY PREVAILED IN CONGRESS
ABOUT GRANTING BILATERAL SECURITY ASSURANCES TO SPAIN. BERGOLD
SAID THAT ANY KIND OF FORMAL BILATERAL SECURITY GUARANTEE TO
SPAIN WOULD REQUIRE A TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN THE SENATE. WHILE THE
LIKELIHOOD OF PASSAGE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE GREATER
NOW THAN IN 1970, SENATE REJECTION OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT
WAS QUITE POSSIBLE AND WOULD PLACE THE ENTIRE CURRENT RELATION-
SHIP AT RISK. THERE WAS A GREATER LIKELIHOOD, HOWEVER, THAT

SUFFICIENT SENATE VOTES COULD BE MUSTERED FOR U.S. APPROVAL
FOR AN EXPANSION OF NATO TO INCLUDE SPAIN.

16. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) ASKED IF THE SPANISH COULD ACCEPT
THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE ALLIANCE AND WERE REALLY ONLY
"HYPOTHETICALLY" INTERESTED IN MEMBERSHIP. BERGOLD REPLIED
THAT WHILE SPANISH INTEREST IN MEMBERSHIP REMAINS ONLY
"HYPOTHETICAL" IN THE ABOVE SENSE AND SPAIN WILL ACCEPT SOME-
THING SHORT OF FULL MEMBERSHIP, THEY CLEARLY WANT SOME KIND OF
CLOSER EXPLICIT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE.

17. DE ROSE ASKED IF THE SPANISH WOULD INSIST THAT THE
EXISTENCE OF SUCH A RELATIONSHIP BE MADE PUBLIC. BERGOLD
REPLIED THAT THE SPANIARDS DOUBTLESS WANT SOMETHING PUBLIC
BUT MIGHT ACCEPT SOMETHING LESS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01978 03 OF 03 102114Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 SSO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SAM-01 INRE-00 /056 W

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INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5212

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 1978

18. PECK SAID HE REPRESENTED ONE OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH

CURRENTLY MAKE IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO. EVEN THOUGH SPAIN MIGHT ALREADY BE IN THE POST-FRANCO ERA, GIVEN RESIDUAL POPULAR ATTITUDES ABOUT THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR IN THE UK AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, POLITICAL CHANGE IN SPAIN WOULD HAVE TO BE QUIRE SUBSTANTIAL BEFORE SPANISH NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

19. BERGOLD NOTED THAT IN SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL WAYS SPAIN HAD BEEN ISOLATED FROM EUROPE SINCE ITS CIVIL WAR AND MANY SPANIARDS BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHANGE WITHIN SPAIN IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD. BERGOLD ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAD NOT BEEN AS MUCH CHANGE AS THE SPANIARDS THINK, SOME CHANGES HAD INDEED OCCURRED IN SUCH AREAS AS PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY LIBERALIZATION. MOST SPANIARDS THINK THAT LIBERALIZATION WILL ACCELERATE AND BRING SPAIN CLOSER TO THE DEMOCRATIC WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES. FOR THIS REASON, SPAIN IS TRYING TO PREPARE NOW TO ASSUME A FUTURE POSITION CLOSER TO THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES.

20. DE FREITAS CRUZ (PORTUGAL) WANTED TO ASK AN "INDISCREET" SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01978 03 OF 03 102114Z

QUESTION BUT WOULD NEITHER INSIST ON AN ANSWER NOR REPORT ANY ANSWER GIVEN BACK TO LISBON. HE ASKED IF BERGOLD HAD NOTICED A STIFFENING IN THE SPANISH NEOGITATING DEMANDS BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL. BERGOLD REPLIED THAT HE COULD IDENTIFY NO SUCH REACTION WHATSOEVER ON THE PART OF THE SPANISH NEGOTIATORS. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD BE LESS THAN CANDID IF HE DID NOT ADMIT HAVING HEARD OF CONSIDERABLE SPANISH INTEREST AND CONCERN ABOUT PORTUGUESE DEVELOPMENTS DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

21. CATALANO (ITALY) ASKED IF THE SPANISH ARGUED THAT THEIR PRESENT DEGREE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION NOW QUALIFIED THEM FOR NATO MEMBER-

SHIP, AND DO THEY TAKE OFFENSE WHEN TOLD THEIR LIBERALIZATION SEEMS INSUFFICIENT. BERGOLD RESPONDED THAT THE SPANIARDS WERE INTELLIGENT AND HAD REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS IN THE ABOVE AREA. THEY FREQUENTLY ASKED, HOWEVER, WHY THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT WORK OUT SOME SORT OF CLOSER NATO RELATIONSHIP FOR SPAIN THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES.

22. MENZIES OBSERVED THAT SPAIN APPEARS TO WANT SOME SORT OF "EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT" WITH THE ALLIANCE THAT WILL NOT REQUIRE FORMAL PUBLIC OR PARLIAMENTARY ACCEPTANCE. MENZIES NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES THIS PRESENTED SINCE THE ALLIES WORK BY CONSENSUS. HE ASKED WHAT THE SPANISH REALISTICALLY HOPED TO ACHIEVE SINCE AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. BERGOLD REPLIED THAT THE U.S. HAD POINTED OUT THESE DIFFICULTIES TO THE SPANIARDS AND HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IDEAS ON BOTH SIDES MIGHT EVOLVE.

23. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT THE WHOLE PROBLEM WAS REALLY ONE OF AN "EXPLICIT" SPANISH ROLE IN NATO. FOR EXAMPLE, REFERRING TO HIS

OWN SUGGESTION, DE STAERCKE NOTED THAT A PRAGMATIC EXTENSION OF THE ALLIANCE TO INCLUDE SPAIN BY MEANS OF A LINK THROUGH SACEUR WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH FOR THE SPANISH SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY FISIBLE OR PUBLIC. DE STAERCKE REFERRED TO THE LEMNITZER-AILLERET AGREEMENTS WHICH ESTABLISHED LINKS BETWEEN NATO AND THE FRENCH MILITARY AFTER DE GULLE'S WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE FROM NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE. DE STAERCKE ASKED RHETORICALLY IF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES (SEVERAL HEAD SHAKES INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT) AND SUFFICIENT FOR SPAIN. THE BEST ARRANGEMENT WOULD OF COURSE BE ONE WHICH CREATED NO PROBLEMS. THUS A "QUIET" LINK BETWEEN SACEUR
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01978 03 OF 03 102114Z

AND THE SPANISH GENERAL STAFF WOULD BE PREFERABLE BUT WOULD NOT MEET MADRID'S REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT.

24. HARTOGH SUGGESTED THAT THE SPANISH SEEM TO ASCRIBE TOO MUCH IMPORTANT TO NATO MEMBERSHIP, AND SEEMED TO WANT WHAT OTHERS ARE CERTAIN TO REFUSE.

25. AMBASSADOR BRUCE NOTED THAT SOME "WINDOW DRESSING" WOULD BE NECESSARY GIVEN SPANISH PRIDE. THE SPANISH KNOW THAT THEY ARE ECONOMICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT. IS THEIR PRIDE SUCH THAT, REBUFFED BY NATO, THEY WOULD CUT PRESENTLY EXISTING SECURITY LINKS WITH THE U.S. AND EUROPE?

26. BERGOLD SAID THE SPANIARDS HAD NEVER TALKED ABOUT SEVERING THEIR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S., BUT ONLY ABOUT MODIFYING THE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. THUS, WHILE THE U.S. COULD BE LEFT WITH MORE MODEST FACILITIES, THERE WAS NO PRESENT LIKELIHOOD OF A TOTAL RUPTURE.

27. MENZIES REPEATED HIS EARLIER QUESTION ABOUT CONTINUING U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE THREE AIR BASES. BERGOLD REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS RESPONSE AND STRESSED AGAIN THAT ZARAGOZA WAS VERY BUSY IN THE WINTER AS AN AIR-TO-GROUND GUNNERY TRAINING FACILITY. THIS TRAINING IS VITAL FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A COUNTER TO RECOGNIZED SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN ARMOR. MENZIES ASKED IF THERE WERE POSSIBLE ALTERNATE TRAINING FACILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. CATALANO NOTED THAT THE DECIMOMANNU FACILITY CONTINUED TO BE AVAILABLE IN SARDINIA, AND BERGOLD NOTED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW NATO TRAINING FACILITY AT TIMBAKION. BUT BERGOLD ADDED THAT THE DENSITY OF THE WINTER-MONTH TRAINING REQUIREMENTS PRESENTS A NEED FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE TRAINING FACILITIES.

28. HARTOGH ASKED IF THE SPANISH REALLY BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE ASSUMING LESS RISK BY HAVING FEWER U.S. FACILITIES. BERGOLD SPECULATED THAT THE SPANISH MIGHT FEEL, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE TOTAL DENUCLEARIZATION OF ROTA WOULD REDUCE THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF

SPAIN AS A TARGET. BERGOLD POINTED OUT THAT THIS JUDGMENT WAS PURELY THE PRODUCT OF HIS OWN SPECULATIONS SINCE THE SPANISH HAD

NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED THIS POINT.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01978 03 OF 03 102114Z

29. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, DE STAERCKE ASKED BERGOLD IF HE HAD ANY CONCLUSIONS TO OFFER. BERGOLD SAID ONLY THAT THE PROBLEM WAS VERY DIFFICULT, BUT ONE WHICH INVOLVES THE INTEREST OF ALL OF US IN FINDING A SOLUTION; AND HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PERMREPS' IDEAS AND COMMENTS.

30. COMMENT: INFORMAL PRIVATE MEETING IN U.S. MISSION WAS CONDUCTIVE TO A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BY PERMREPS. PERMREPS' APPROACH TO U.S. BRIEFING WAS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FULL AND FORTHRIGHT BRIEFING BY MR. BERGOLD. IMPRESSION IS THAT PERMREPS WILL GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO MATTER. END COMMENT.BRUCE

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